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The Retreat from Obscenity:
Redrup v. New Yorkt
By DwI GHT L. TEETER, JR.,* AND
DON R. PEMBER1
FOR the past dozen years, the Supreme Court of the United States
has been increasingly preoccupied with drawing a line between the first
amendment right of free expression and the right of society to con-
trol obscenity. Each of the famous cases in this area-including
Roth v. United States,' Jacobellis v. Ohio,2 Ginzburg v. United States,'
and The Fanny Hill Case4 -has made the Court's efforts more difficult
by adding new guidelines instead of clarifying old ones. The result:
the Supreme Court, as Justice Jackson predicted in 1948, has indeed
become the "High Court of Obscenity."5
In the spring of 1967, however, the Court indicated in Redrup
v. New York6 that it is trying to extricate itself from the judicial thicket
these decisions have created. Thus, Redrup may be the most impor-
tant obscenity decision since the 1957 landmark of Roth v. United
States.7  This assertion may puzzle some attorneys because the Redrup
decision, while receiving front-page coverage in the New York Times"
and the Washington Post9 when first announced, has received little
subsequent publicity in the news media and virtually no attention in law
journals.10 The opinion does not look important; it was a per curiam
t 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam).
* Associate Professor of Journalism, University of Wisconsin.
1 Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Communications.
1. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
2. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
3. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
4. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as The Fanny Hill Case
or Fanny Hill].
5. See Lewis, Sex and the Supreme Court, EsQum, June, 1963, at 82.
6. 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
7. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
8. See note 10 infra.
9. Id.
10. Redrup was mentioned in at least two law journals through October 1968.
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decision so short that it now takes up only three pages in the Supreme
Court Reporter, including a one-page dissent by Justice Harlan and
the now-retired Justice Clark. Redrup may have appeared as just
another obscenity case, one of many before the Court in the last few
years.
11
Although ignored by the law journals, Redrup has been used vigor-
ously by justices and judges. As of March, 1969, Redrup had been
cited as controlling or as a key factor in the reversal of 35 state and
federal obscenity convictions.' 2 At this point, the case could mean at
least two things. First, where content of publications charged to be
obscene is in question, federal and state prosecutions will not be success-
ful unless it can be shown that the material involved is what Justice
Stewart calls hard-core pornography.' Second, it seems that the Su-
preme Court has decided that the time has come to begin putting men,
not books or motion pictures, on trial. Consequently, the Redrup case
and its offspring are placing greater emphasis on the conduct of a
defendant rather than the color of the material he has distributed."
The purpose of this article is to discuss briefly the rather confusing
tangle of obscenity cases prior to Redrup, and then to describe the
Supreme Court's use of the Redrup language to redefine and clarify this
area of the law.
The Background For Redrup: Roth (1957)
Through Ginzburg (1966)
Before analyzing Redrup in detail, it is necessary to consider some
of the key tests or standards for determining obscenity used by the
Supreme Court during the decade before Redrup. First, of course, was
that acknowledged landmark in the American law of obscenity, the 1957
decision in Roth v. United States.'5 Here, the Court for the first time
See Elias, Sex Publications and Moral Corruption: The Supreme Court Dilemma, 9
WM. & MARY L. REv. 302, 303 n.4 (1967); Sutter, Separate Obscenity Standard for
Youth: Potential Court Escape Route from its "Supercensor" Role, 1 GA. L. REv. 707,
730 n.151 (1967). Unfortunately, both authors misread the Redrup decision, the former
arguing that the convictions were reversed on the basis of the Roth standard, the latter
contending that procedural grounds were used to justify the reversal. For news coverage
of Redrup, see N.Y. Times, May 9, 1967, at 1, col. 1; Washington Post, May 9, 1967,
at 1, col. 1.
11. See, e.g., 388 U.S. 439-54 (1967) where some 14 per curiam decisions, all
dealing with obscenity and all decided June 12, may be found.
12. See cases cited notes 95-97 infra.
13. This argument has been advanced by at least one judge. State v. J.L. Mar-
shall News Co., 13 Ohio Misc. 60, 61, 232 N.E.2d 435, 436 (C.P. 1967).
14. See cases cited notes 95-97 infra.
15. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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directly ruled that obscenity laws are constitutional exercises of govern-
ment's police power. In language that was to become important in
later cases, Justice Brennan wrote for the Court:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance--
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the pre-
vailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guar-
anties [of free speech and press], unless excludable because they
encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. But
implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of
obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance."6
In 1957, the phrase "redeeming social importance," which was
to be used to protect literature in subsequent obscenity decisions, was
merely dictum.17  The test for determining obscenity in the Roth case
was
whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest.'8
Although Roth remains an important decision in the law of ob-
scenity, if not the most important, later decisions by the Supreme Court
have shown that it settled little. In 1962, five years after Roth, the
case of Manual Enterprises v. Day9 brought before the Court magazines
which Justice Harlan termed "dismally unpleasant, uncouth and
tawdry,"20 and which were published "primarily, if not exclusively, for
homosexuals."2 1  Even so, with Harlan announcing the judgment, a
majority of the Court ruled that magazines such as Manual, Trim, and
Grecian Pictorial were not obscene and unmailable because they were
not "patently offensive." Harlan wrote:
These magazines cannot be deemed so offensive on their face as
to affront current community standards of decency-a quality that
we shall hereafter refer to as "patent offensiveness" or "indecency."
Lacking that quality, the magazines cannot be deemed legally "ob-
scene" .
Obscenity under the federal statute. . . requires proof of two
distinct elements: (1) patent offensiveness; and (2) "prurient
interest" appeal. Both must conjoin before challenged material
can be found "obscene" under § 1461 [of Title 18 of the United
States Code]. In most obscenity cases, to be sure, the two elements
tend to coalesce, for that which is patently offensive will also usually
carry the requisite "prurient interest" appeal. It is only in the
16. Id. at 484.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 489.
19. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
20. Id. at 490.
21. Id. at 481.
November 19691
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
unusual instance where, as here, the "prurient interest" appeal of
the material is found limited to a particular class of persons that
occasion arises for a truly independent inquiry into the question
whether or not the material is patently offensive.
22
Harlan reiterated the long-held Supreme Court position that nudity, by
itself, was not obscene.2" The major element added by the Manual
decision was the qualification that to be obscene, material has to be
"patently offensive."
The tricky phrase "contemporary community standards," first used
in Roth,24 cropped up again in 1964 in Jacobellis v. Ohio.2 5 Announc-
ing the judgment of the Court, Justice Brennan ruled that the French
film Les Amants was not obscene. He declared that constitutional
questions of obscenity should not be decided on the basis of the stand-
ards of a particular community where a case arose; instead said Brennan,
no "'local' definition of the 'community' could properly be employed in
delineating the area of expression that is protected by the Federal Con-
stitution. '26 Brennan added:
The Court has explicitly refused to tolerate a result whereby "the
constitutional limits of free expression in the Nation would vary with
state lines" . . . . [W]e see even less justification for allowing
such limits to vary with town or county lines. We thus affirm the
position taken in Roth to the effect that the constitutional status
of an allegedly obscene work must be determined on the basis of a
national standard. It is, after all, a national Constitution we are
expounding.
27
Despite these words, no truly "national standard" or test for
judging obscenity has ever been agreed to by a majority of the Court.
In Jacobellis, only two Justices, Brennan" and Goldberg,29 explicitly
stated that there should be such a "national standard." Three other
Justices who agreed with the Court's judgment in favor of Jacobellis
based their decision upon different grounds.
3 0
Then, on March 21, 1966, the Court announced decisions in
three obscenity cases: The Fanny Hill Case,
3 Mishkin v. New York, 82
22. Id. at 486.
23. Id. at 490.
24. See text at note 18 supra.
25. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
26. Id. at 193.
27. Id. at 194-95 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 195. Justice White concurred in the judgment but wrote no opinion.
29. ld. at 198.
30. Id. at 196 (Black & Douglas, JJ.); id. at 197 (Stewart, J.).
31. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
32. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
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and Ginzburg v. United States.8" Fanny Hill, also known as The
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, was written in England about 1749
by John Cleland. First published in the United States about 1800,
this book also seems to have been the first in America to have become
the subject of an obscenity trial-during 1821, in Massachusetts.84
More than 140 years later, the Supreme Court, through Justice Brennan,
held that this frankly erotic novel could not be found obscene because
it was not "utterly without redeeming social value."8 5 Brennan, sum-
ming up the Supreme Court's approved test for obscenity up to 1966,
attempted to reconcile the various standards into this listing:
We defined obscenity in Roth in the following terms:
"[Whether to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest" . . . . Under this definition,
as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements must coalesce:
it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the
material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary com-
munity standards relating to the description or representation of
sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming
social value.80
Justice Brennan also wrote the majority opinion in Mishkin v.
New York.87 Edward Mishkin, operator of a bookshop near New York
City's Times Square, had been convicted for publishing more than 50
paperbacks specializing in sadism and masochism. With not a little
sophistry, Mishkin's attorneys argued that since most people would be
nauseated rather than titillated by such books, these materials were not
obscene because they did not appeal to the prurient interest of an
average person. Brennan neatly sidestepped this challenge in his ma-
jority opinion, declaring that the Court adjusts "the prurient-appeal
requirement to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of
material to be assessed in terms of sexual interests of its . . . recipient
"8group ....
Finally, Brennan announced the Court's decision in the case in-
volving Ralph Ginzburg, publisher of the hardcover magazine Eros
and the book entitled The Housewife's Handbook on Selective Promis-
cuity.39 Ginzburg argued in his appeal that his publications were not
obscene under the Supreme Court's definitions of the term. Brennan
33. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
34. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 335 (1821).
35. See 383 U.S. at 419-20.
36. Id. at 418.
37. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
38. Id. at 509.
39. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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neither agreed or disagreed, but merely said that in this case Ginzburg's
advertising was more important than his books, since, in his ads, Ginz-
burg had implied that the material was obscene. There was abundant
evidence, Brennan said, "that each of the accused publications was
originated or sold as stock in trade of the sordid business of pandering
-'the business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly advertised
to appeal to the erotic interest of their customers.' "40 Pandering has
been popularly defined as printing a provocative cover, advertising
prior banning, displaying the item massed with other borderline items,
or in various ways urging erotic, deviant, or scatological appeal.4 '
Brennan noted that Ginzburg had attempted to get mailing privileges
for his advertising circulars from the villages of Blue Ball and Inter-
course, Pa., and finally mailed them from Middlesex, N.J.4 2  Brennan
said that conduct such as this indicated "pandering." In other words,
it didn't really matter whether the Supreme Court believed the publica-
tions to be obscene; it was enough that Ginzburg believed them to be
obscene and demonstrated this through his advertising campaign.
43
The majority opinion was challenged by several heated dissents.
Justice Black, who had often argued that freedom of expression should
be absolute, declared that Ginzburg had been sentenced to serve five
years in prison for "distributing printed matter about sex which neither
Ginzburg nor anyone else could possibly have known to be criminal."44
Justice Harlan contended that the Court's majority had rewritten the
federal obscenity statute in order to convict Ginzburg.45 From the
standpoint of Redrup, however, the most important dissent came from
Justice Stewart, who noted that "Ginzburg was not charged with
Ccommercial exploitation'; he was not charged with 'pandering'; he was
not charged with 'titillation.' "I" Stewart said that the first amend-
ment has made restriction of printed material the exception rather than
the rule; and in his view, there was only one class of material that
might be constitutionally suppressed-what he called hard-core por-
nography. He borrowed language from a brief prepared by Thurgood
Marshall, then Solicitor General of the United States, for his definition of
hard-core pornography. It included
photographs, both still and motion picture, with no pretense of
40. Id. at 467.
41. F. Kui, FoOLI SHFIGLEAVES? 78 (1967).
42. 383 U.S. at 467-68.
43. Id. at 470-71.
44. Id. at 476.
45. Id. at 494.
46. Id. at 500.
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artistic value, graphically depicting acts of sexual intercourse, in-
cluding various acts of sodomy and sadism, and sometimes involv-
ing several participants in scenes of orgy-like character. They
also include strips of drawings in comic-book format grossly de-
picting similar activities in an exaggerated fashion. There are, in
addition, pamphlets and booklets, sometimes with photographic
illustrations, verbally describing such activities in a bizarre manner
with no attempt whatsoever to afford portrayals of character or
situation and with no pretense to literary value.
47
Ginzburg's publications did not fall into the category of hard-core
pornography, Stewart said, and therefore could not be constitutionally
suppressed.
These cases-Roth, Manual, Jacobellis, Fanny Hill, Mishkin, and
Ginzburg-were all important parts of the background for Redrup v.
New York.
The Redrup Decision
Important legal principles sometimes arrive in curious packages,
and the Redrup case had few of the earmarks of a landmark decision.
Although cited simply as Redrup v. New York, this decision actually
resulted from the Court's simultaneous consideration of three state cases;
the one from New York s and two others, Austin v. Kentucky, 9 and
Gent v. Arkansas,50 each dealing with sexy paperback novels and with
what are called in the vernacular, "girlie magazines."
In Redrup, a plainclothes policeman had purchased paperbacks
entitled Lust Pool and Shame Agent from Robert Redrup, a clerk in a
New York City newstand. As a result of this sale, Redrup was con-
victed of violating a New York state criminal law;51 his conviction was
affirmed on appeal; and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.52 In
Austin, a woman specifically asked for, and purchased, the publica-
tions High Heels and Spree from a salesgirl in William L. Austin's
newsstand in Paducah, Kentucky. Because of this sale, Austin was
subsequently convicted of violating a Kentucky obscenity statute.53
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky overruled Austin's motion for appeal
47. Id. at 499 n.3.
48. (N.Y. App. T. 1965) (unpublished decision), cert. granted, 384 U.S. 916
(1966).
49. 386 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. 1965), cert. granted, 384 U.S. 916 (1966).
50. 239 Ark. 474, 393 S.W.2d 219 (1965), prob. jurls. noted, 384 U.S. 937
(1966).
51. 3 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1881, ch. 676, § 317, at 77-78, as amended, 2 N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1900, ch. 731, § 1, at 1576 (repealed 1967) (corresponds to N.Y. PENAL LAW
H§ 235.05, 235.10(2) (McKinney 1967)).
52. 384 U.S. 916 (1966).
53. 11962] Ky. Acts, ch. 273, H9 1-4, at 945-46 (repealed 1968).
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and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.5 4  In
Gent v. Arkansas, the prosecuting attorney for the Eleventh Judicial
District of that state brought a civil proceeding to have certain issues of
some "girlie magazines" declared obscene. Distribution of these pub-
lications was to be enjoined and the magazines were to be surrendered
and destroyed under Arkansas law." The Supreme Court of Arkansas
ultimately affirmed judgments against the magazines involved and the
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. 6
When granting certiorari in Redrup and Austin, and noting prob-
able jurisdiction in Gent, the Court carefully narrowed the issues to be
considered in each case. In Redrup and Austin, the Court agreed to
consider only whether the state must prove that the defendants had
knowledge of the character of the contents of the publications before
a conviction could be sustained.5 7 In Gent, the questions that the Court
said it would hear on appeal included whether the Arkansas statute was
an unconstitutional prior restraint on expression and whether the statute
was unconstitutionally vague.58  In all three cases, the Court had as-
sumed that the material in question was "obscene in the constitutional
sense"; but, as the unidentified Justice wrote in the Redrup majority
opinion (the suspicion arises that the opinion may have been delivered
unsigned out of a profound sense of embarrassment), "we have concluded
that the hypothesis upon which the Court originally proceeded was in-
valid. . . ."0 In other words, the material was not obscene in the con-
stitutional sense.
Here Redrup began to cover new ground in the never-never land
of obscenity law. The majority opinion listed a number of previously
used standards of the Court for judging obscenity. Two Justices,
evidently Black and Douglas, "have consistently adhered to the view
that a State is utterly without power to suppress, control, or punish the
distribution of any writings or pictures upon the ground of their 'ob-
scenity' ";61 while a third Justice, apparently Stewart, was characterized
as being of the opinion that a state's power to punish obscenity is
54. 384 U.S. 916 (1966).
55. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2713 to -2728 (1964).
56. 384 U.S. 937 (1966).
57. 384 U.S. 916 (1966). The Court limited its consideration to the specific
scienter requirements announced in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), where the
Court had held that a defendant criminally charged with purveying obscene material
must be shown to have had some knowledge of the character of the material. Id. at 154.
58. 384 U.S. 937 (1966).
59. 386 U.S. at 769.
60. Id. at 770.
61. Id.
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"narrowly limited to a distinct and clearly identifiable class of material
. . . ."-the so-called hard-core pornography test noted previously. 2
The unidentified author of the opinion then stated that other Justices,
probably Warren, Fortas and Brennan, agreed to a standard quite
close to that suggested by Stewart;63 and finally, he noted that "another
Justice," evidently White, "has not viewed the 'social value' element as
an independent factor in the judgment of obscenity." 64
After listing all of these tests for judging obscenity, the Court
seemed to virtually throw up its hands in defeat, declaring: "Which-
ever of these constitutional views is brought to bear upon the cases
before us, it is clear that the judgments [convicting Redrup, Austin and
Gent] cannot stand. Accordingly, the judgment in each case is re-
versed.""
The inclusion of Justice Stewart's yardstick concerning hard-core
pornography may be especially significant; at least one lower-state-
court judge has ruled that the central meaning of Redrup is found in
Stewart's definition. Ohio Judge Bettman stated in December of
1967 that the Stewart standard has been absorbed into the Supreme
Court's standard of obscenity; and that from now on, only hard-core
pornography can be proscribed.6 Under this new test, according to
Bettman, "any ordinary book or magazine seller. . . is constitutionally
protected against prosecution for material, other than hard-core por-
nography . . ,6. He suggested that by taking this step, "the Court
has made clear it is determined to close once and for all the Pandora's
box it opened in Roth v. United States. . . which required all the courts
in the country to act as constitutional literary censors."68  Only time
will tell whether Judge Bettman has correctly read the central meaning
of Redrup; but if he is correct, the Supreme Court has gone a long way
toward simplifying the task of judging allegedly obscene content.
However, Redrup dealt not only with content, but also with con-
duct of persons who distribute material suspected of being obscene.
In its approach to conduct, the cryptic Redrup opinion gave a broad
hint of enlarging a policy started in Ginzburg, in which the Court
held that the manner in which books or magazines were marketed
62. Id. See text at note 45 supra.
63. Id. at 770-71.
64. Id. at 771.
65. Id.
66. State v. J.L. Marshall News Co., 13 Ohio Misc. 60, 62, 232 N.E.2d 435,
436 (C.P. 1967).
67. Id. at 61, 232 N.E.2d at 437.
68. Id. at 61, 232 N.E.2d at 436.
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would be taken heavily into consideration in ruling whether books or
magazines were obscene. The Ginzburg decision suggested that if the
publisher advertises or markets his material with great emphasis on the
sexually provocative aspects of his publication, such emphasis might be
decisive in the Court's determination of the question of obscenity; if
a publisher claims his books are obscene, courts may take his claims at
face value and find him guilty of violating obscenity laws.69
In Redrup, the Court appeared to be extending its Ginzburg de-
cision to include both methods of distribution and a consideration of the
kinds of person to whom the material might be offered. The opinion
listed three categories of marketing that might cause the distribution of
otherwise protected material to become a criminal act: (a) The sale of
sexually titillating materials to juveniles; (b) the distribution of such
materials in a manner that is an assault upon individual privacy be-
cause it is impossible for an unwilling recipient to avoid exposure to it;
and (c) sales made in a "pandering" fashion under circumstances sim-
ilar to those which caused the Court to uphold the obscenity conviction
of Ralph Ginzburg in 1966.70
While there is always a danger of reading more into a decision
than is really there, it is reasonable to infer from the decision that the
Supreme Court is adopting a "standards of conduct" test. A standard
of conduct, such as whether or not the distribution constituted an
assault on individual privacy, is much more susceptible to traditional
tests of evidence than abstract "standards of obscenity" advanced by the
Court in cases such as Roth and Fanny Hill. It would be comparatively
simple, for example, for a prosecutor to introduce evidence to show
that allegedly obscene posters were pasted on a billboard alongside the
main thoroughfare into town. Testing the standard of conduct involved
in displaying the posters seems far simpler than wading into the prob-
lems that attend determining whether the posters possess any "redeem-
ing social value" or whether they go beyond customary limits of candor
in a contemporary community."'
The three standards of conduct were merely listed in Redrup, with
little illumination provided other than that offered by bare citations of
decisions; analysis of the supporting cases cited in Redrup, however,
may provide some additional insights into the standards of conduct
sought by the Court.
69. See 383 U.S. 463, 469-71.
70. 386 U.S. at 769.




In 1957, the United States Supreme Court struck down a Michigan
statute on first amendment grounds because it listed as obscene any
thing which might corrupt the morals of youth;72 if strictly enforced, it
would limit adults to reading only those things which were fit for
children. While the Court suggested in Redrup that statutes which
reflect a "specific and limited state concern for juveniles" might be safe
from constitutional attack, they should not be designed to limit what all
citizens might read, but only what children might read.74 This sug-
gestion of a standard that could deal specifically with juveniles was soon
put to use by the Court in Ginsberg v. New York. 5 There, the Court
upheld the obscenity conviction of Sam Ginsberg for selling two "girlie"
magazines to a 16-year-old boy in violation of a New York statute for-
bidding sale of certain kinds of materials to children under the age of
17,76 the same type of material that had been declared not obscene in
the Redrup case. In affirming Ginsberg's conviction, Justice Brennan
accepted the concept of "variable obscenity"-that is, under the terms
of the New York statute, the state could punish the act of selling certain
magazines to individuals under 17 years of age; sale of the same
magazines to individuals 17 and over, however, was not criminal.
77
On the same day that it upheld Ginsberg's conviction, the Court
struck down a Dallas, Texas, film censorship ordinance" which pro-
vided for a board to review films and classify them as being suitable or
not suitable for young persons. 9 The Court ruled that the statutory
standard-describing or portraying sexual promiscuity-could not be
a constitutionally adequate guide, since it provided no narrowly drawn,
definite criterion for the board to follow." It is apparent, therefore,
that while the Court seems willing to allow the states to discriminate be-
tween what is obscene for juveniles and what is obscene for adults, it
nevertheless will insist that such legislation adopt reasonably precise
standards so that those administering it are governed by an objective
guide.8 '
72. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
73. Id. at 383.
74. See 386 U.S. at 769.
75. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
76. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 484-h (McKinney 1967).
77. 390 U.S. at 635-36.
78. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
79. DALLAS, TEx. REV. CODE OF CIVIL & CRIM. ORDINANCES § 46A (1960).
80. See 390 U.S. at 689-90.
81. See id. at 689, quoting People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 313, 206 N.E.2d
330, 335, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386, 393 (1965) (Fuld, I., concurring).
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The next standard of conduct outlined in Redrup involved a vague
concept of privacy. The Court suggested that if material was presented
so that it was impossible for an individual to avoid exposure to it, such
material might lose the protection of the first amendment.8 2  It did
not elaborate on this standard, citing only two privacy-related, nonob-
scenity cases in its opinion: Breard v. Alexandria,"3 which involved
prosecution of door-to-door magazine salesmen under a municipal
ordinance, and Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,84 which con-
cerned the legality of the use of radio receivers in privately owned, but
municipally franchised, buses and streetcars. In Breard, the Court said
that the ordinance regulating door-to-door sales was designed to pro-
tect the "living rights of others to privacy and repose" and did not in-
fringe upon freedom of the press.8 5 In Pollak, the Court declared that
the Constitution does not secure a right of privacy to each bus passenger
equal to his right of privacy enjoyed at home. Consequently, the use of
radio receivers was consistent with the public convenience, comfort,
and safety of passengers.8 6
Neither the Breard nor the Pollak cases, however, are really rele-
vant to the kind of conduct that the Supreme Court condemns in
Redrup. One suspects that bawdy movie posters in front of a theater on
a public street, unsolicited sexy literature that arrives in the mail, or the
blaring amplification of "party" songs over loudspeakers are the kinds
of privacy-invading conduct that the Court had in mind in Redrup.
Such a principle might be applied to proscribe the use of shocking
words or pictures in a widely circulated publication such as a daily
newspaper or family magazine where such material is not customarily
found. This kind of conduct, it may be surmised, might remove con-
stitutional protection from sexually uninhibited, but otherwise constitu-
tionally protected material.8 7  It should be emphasized, however, that
82. See id. at 681-83.
83. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
84. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
85. 341 U.S. at 625-26, 645.
86. 343 U.S. at 464-65.
87. Recently the importance of the privacy aspect of the Redrup decision has
been emphasized if not clarified by the so-called "obscene films" case, Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). In Stanley the Supreme Court ruled that mere private
possession of obscene materials, in the absence of an intent to sell or circulate, is
not punishable criminal behavior. Justice Harlan said that "[i]f the First Amend-
ment means anything, it means that a state has no business telling a man, sitting alone
in his own house, what books he may read or films he may watch." Id. at 565. This
is, in a sense, the converse of the Redrup idea that blatant imposition of such
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the Supreme Court has never used the specific standard in question in
gauging the conduct of a defendant in an obscenity case, nor can such a
test be found in other reported federal or state decisions.
Pandering Sales
Finally, the Court in Redrup reiterated its condemnation of sales
of material made in a pandering fashion, a denunciation first made
explicit in Ginzburg in 1966, but which had been hinted at in the Roth
case of 1957.88 As noted above,8 9 Justice Brennan in Ginzburg said
that although publications which were involved in obscenity prosecu-
tions might not be obscene in themselves, convictions could be sus-
tained if there was evidence of the defendant's pandering in efforts to
sell the publications. The Court's reemphasis of pandering, along
with its concern about sales to juveniles and distribution which invades
privacy, adds up to a significant shift in emphasis. In sum, the Court
seems to be groping for a "standard of conduct." While perhaps not
as permissive as the enlarged "standard of obscenity" that has blossomed
since Roth, the "standard of conduct" idea nevertheless seems more
viable, more susceptible to physical proof, and may offer clearer guide-
lines to publishers or film distributors.
The question must be raised, however, whether a part of the free-
dom to publish and to read should be sacrificed in the interest of clearer
guidelines and more workable standards. Although Redrup has been
used to reverse obscenity convictions, it contains a monumental in-
ternal inconsistency that may someday be used to justify obscenity
convictions, not overturn them. On the one hand, the majority opinion
in Redrup seems to suggest that only hard-core pornography, quite
rigorously defined, can be suppressed;"° but on the other hand, conduct
of the seller or distributor can somehow alter content, can somehow
make "good" books "bad." Thus the stringent definition of "hard-
core pornography" advanced by Justice Stewart could be little protection
for a distribution of material that was seen by a court to be an in-
vasion of privacy, a sale to a minor, or a "pandering" sale. Conduct
may indeed be easier to judge than content; but such a system, as
Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent to the Ginzburg 1 and Mish-
materials upon persons, invading their privacy, is outside the range of permissible
conduct.
88. See 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (Warren, C.1.) (concurring opinion).
89. See text at notes 40-43 supra.
90. See 386 U.S. at 770-71.
91. 383 U.S. 463, 482 (1966).
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kin92 cases, could contain real dangers to freedom of the press:
A book should stand on its own, irrespective of the reasons why it
was written or the wiles used in selling it. I cannot imagine any
promotional effort that would make chapters 7 and 8 of the Song
of Solomon any the less or any more worthy of First Amendment
protection than does their unostentatious inclusion in the average
edition of the Bible.
93
The Impact of Redrup
Although at first glance Redrup might appear noteworthy only for
its ambiguity, it is nonetheless a decision to be reckoned with because
of its impact on recent obscenity cases. In little more than a year and
a half the case has been cited either as controlling or as a key factor in
the reversal of 35 reported obscenity convictions.9 4 The Supreme Court
has used Redrup in reversing state obscenity law convictions in Indiana,
Ohio, Tennessee, Georgia, Kansas, New York, California, Alabama,
Florida and Louisiana;95 in addition, federal courts have used Redrup
to overturn convictions in at least eight federal prosecutions;96 finally,
state courts in California, New Jersey, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Missouri,
and New York have upset local obscenity convictions by using this 1967
per curiam decision.
9 7
92. 383 U.S. 502, 514 (1966).
93. 383 U.S. at 482-83.
94. Cases cited notes 95-97 infra.
95. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629 (1968); Henry v. Louisiana, 392 U.S. 655 (1968); Felton v. Pensacola, 390 U.S.
340 (1968); Robert-Arthur Management Corp. v. Tennessee ex rel. Canale, 389 U.S.
578 (1968); I.M. Amusement Corp. v. Ohio, 389 U.S. 573 (1968); Chance v.
California, 389 U.S. 89 (1967); Corner v. Hammond, 389 U.S. 48 (1967); Schackman
v. California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967); Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967); A Quantity of
Books v. Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967); Avansino v. New York, 388 U.S. 446 (1967);
Shepard v. New York, 388 U.S. 444 (1967); Cobert v. New York, 388 U.S. 443 (1967);
Ratner v. California, 388 U.S. 442 (1967); Friedman v. New York, 388 U.S. 441
(1967); Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440 (1967). See also Culbertson v. California,
385 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1967).
96. Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); Potomac
News Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967); Books, Inc. v. United States, 388
U.S. 449 (1967); Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); Luros v. United States,
389 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1968); Grant v. United States, 380 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1967);
United States v. 127,295 Copies of Magazines, 295 F. Supp. 1186 (D. Md. 1968);
United States v. 4,400 Copies of Magazines, 276 F. Supp. 902 (D. Md. 1967).
97. People v. Bonanza Printing Co., 271 A.C.A. 726, 76 Cal. Rptr. 379 (Super.
Ct. App. Dep't 1969); State v. Romaine, 38 Ill. 2d 329, 231 N.E.2d 413 (1967); People
v. Zerilli, 14 Mich. App. 513, 165 N.W.2d 619 (Ct. App. 1968); Olsen v. Doerfler, 14
Mich. App. 428, 165 N.W.2d 648 (Ct. App. 1968); State v. Smith, 422 S.W.2d 50 (Mo.
1967); G.P. Putnam's Sons v. Calissi, 50 N.J. 397, 235 A.2d 893 (1967); State v. Baird,
50 N.J. 376, 235 A.2d 673 (1967); People v. Stabile, 58 Misc. 2d 905, 296 N.Y.S.2d 815
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Despite the ambiguity of the Redrup decision, the case seems to
indicate that the Supreme Court may well be moving toward Justice
Stewart's definition of obscenity, and thus be drawing a new line that is
more congenial to the circulation of literature; perhaps it is hard-core
pornography, and hard-core pornography alone, to paraphrase Justice
Stewart, that government may constitutionally suppress.98
Much more important, however, the Court's stress in Redrup on the
conduct of the defendant rather than on the nature of the material
indicates that it may finally be heeding the warning given by Chief
Justice Warren, ten years earlier in Roth that "[ilt is not the book that
is on trial; it is a person. The conduct of the defendant is the central
issue, not the obscenity of a book or picture."99 By making conduct of
the defendant the central issue in many obscenity cases, the Court is to
some extent relieving itself of its unenviable censorial chores as the
'U-igh Court of Obscenity."
The Redrup decision suggests that unless the suspect material meets
a rigorous definition of hard-core pornography, or unless the defendant
has conducted himself in a clearly defined proscribed manner, the first
amendment bars any conviction for obscenity. For those who lament
because the law has arrived at such a conclusion, 00 perhaps the words
of Judge Bettman of Ohio may prove instructive:
[I]t must be reiterated that in a democratic society, except in
prohibition of clearly definable acts of aggression by one member
of society against another, the law cannot enforce morality, how-
ever desirable such an aim might be. The burden of teaching
man to choose the good and reject the evil must rest as it tra-
ditionally has on the family, the school and the church. 10
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1969); State v. J.L. Marshall News Co., 13 Ohio Misc. 60, 232 N.E.2d
435 (C.P. 1967).
98. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
99. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (concurring opinion).
100. The late Justice Musmanno of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, perhaps
one of the most outspoken critics of the United States Supreme Court's obscenity de-
cisions, was profoundly irritated by the Redrup decision. He was especially hostile to the
Supreme Court's use of Redrup in obscenity memorandum decisions in which the only
justification given by the Court was the bare, bold citation of Redrup v. New York.
Musmanno declared: 'The reason so many Justices gave no reason for their de-
cisions is that there is no reason to the decisions. . . . [T]he Supreme Court ...
has failed to live up to its solemn responsibility . . . ." Commonwealth v. Dell
Publications, Inc., 427 Pa. 189, 231, 233 A.2d 840, 862 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
101. State v. J.L. Marshall News Co., 13 Ohio Misc. 60, 62, 232 N.E.2d 435,
437 (C.P. 1967).
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